Assess the Importance of Ideology in the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy to 1939

From Hitlers appointment as Chancellor on January 30 1933 to the beginning of WWII on Sept 3 1939, the national socialist state pursued an aggressive strange indemnity that contributed more often than not to the let onbreak of war. This impertinent policy was largely reflective of the goals Hitler had set out in his 1924 autobiography Mein Kampf, particularly Germanys easterly moving aggressions. However, although Nazi ideology vie a dominant role in structuring foreign policy to 1939, it was besides bullyly influenced by the response of the affiliate to aggressions and hence Hitlers perception of which foreign policies could be most successful.Hence, whilst Nazi ideology surmises the ultimate goals of Nazi foreign policy to 1939, the role of events from 1933-1939 played a significant detail in determining Germanys actions. Hitlers sense of politics and race can be summed up in world view (world view), as depict in Mein Kampf. Written in 1924 later on Hitler had been arrested for an attempt coup, the autobiography deals with the issues plaguing Germany at the time, including the instability of the Weimar Republic and the problem of WWI reparation payments as set out in the 1919 conformity of Versailles.Hitler, as a constituent of nationalist Nazi party, despised democracy, and believed that it undermined Germanys success. Further, Hitler gave validity to the stabbing in the back myth, claiming that WWIs loss had been unnecessary, and had been caused as a result of the shrewd Jewish state. Using these intellectuals, Hitler believed that should Germany be boomed into a grossdeutschland by creating aliment space (living room) in the resource-rich East, wherein the superior Aryan race could reside.All other races, particularly Slavs & Jews, were denoted as racially inferior, and were intended by Hitler to be used as slaves. throughout Mein Kampf, Hitler euphorically and openly describes his war intentions for Germany, in quotes much(prenomina l) as Any conglutination whose purpose is not the intention to wage war is useless. However, when Hitler came to ply in 1933, Germany was unfit to pursue Hitlers aims, and required a great deal of restructuring in format to increase output and production.Therefore, despite Hitlers ultimately war goals, he was forced to delay aggressions until the German force could be rebuilt. This began in 1935, when Hitler announced open plans for rearmament and introduced conscription, in order to fort and prepare the Wehrmacht. This was a direct violation of the agreement of Versailles, however the Allies chose not to act. At this stage, Hitlers popularity as a leader was large, seen by the success of the Saar plebiscite in January 1935 in which the Saarlands population chose to rejoin Germany, as before the Treaty.Even by the end of 1935, it was pop off that Nazi Germany was expanding, and intended to continue. On March 7th 1936, Hitler ordered the invasion of the Rhineland. This foreig n policy was incredibly aggressive, and showed even greater disregard for the ground of treaty. The Rhineland had been established by the Treaty as buffer mingled with France and Germany, in order to ensure Frances safety after the German invasion of WWI. By invading it, Hitler immediately threatened France, and demo his serious intent to expand Germany, as outlined in Mein Kampf.However, although this invasion coheres to the ideologies outlined in Mein Kampf, namely the reversal of the Treaty of Versailles, the invasion was largely experimental, and establish on the previous non-action of the Allies to Hitlers defiance of the treaty. A mere 22,000 German troops entered the Rhineland, and could hire easily been suppressed by Allied forces, Hitler himself admitting that had the French resisted, Germany would be forced to recede immediately. Despite this, the Allies chose not to respond yet again.This was a decisive point in structuring future Nazi foreign policy, as it demo nstrated the Allies unwillingness to participate in conflict, and preference to appease. Had the Allies stop the occupation of the Rhineland, it is unlikely that Hitlers aggressive foreign policies would have been so actively pursued, as they risked increased resistance and further embarrassment. In October 1936, the Rome-Berlin axis vertebra was realised, a policy-making alliance linking the fascist forces of Italy under Mussolini with Nazi Germany.At this time, Italy excessively was pursuing an aggressive foreign policy in order to create a racially perfect Italy, goals similar to those of Hitler. Hence, the signing of this agreement indicates Hitlers intention to keep to his racial ideologies, and to link with necessary powers in order to make lebensraum for the Aryan race. Further, the Hossbach memorandum of 1937 clearly demonstrates Hitlers plans to expand Europe in order to strengthen Europe, and his intentions to formulate foreign policy based on these aims.In March 1938 , Hitler affected Anschluss with Germany-a union that had been forbidden by the Treaty. This posit was met with opposition by Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg, who insisted on a plebiscite. However, after a large amount of pressure, the Anschluss was agreed to, and shortly after, German troops entered Austria. German and Austrian union had been forbidden specifically after their loaded alliance in WWI, and the threat they posed as a unite force. By 1938, Hitler had defied the Treaty of Versailles several times, and had yet to undertake resistance by the Allies.Particularly in the case of Austria, the Allies chose to not intervene because of a flavor that Germany was simply marching into its backyard. On top of this, by 1938 Germany was experiencing high living standards as a result of Hitlers volksgemeinschaft and was a formidable power, consequently the Allies recognised German desire for expansion into a previously had region. It also evident that Hitler mum this detail in the timing of the Anschluss-when in 1936 Hitler had make similar demands, the Allies stood opposed, and the Wehrmacht was ill-equipped to defy Allied wishes.In 1938 Hitler understood Germanys military capacity, and used its position to pursue the foreign policies based on the ideologies in Mein Kampf. By 1938, Hitler had acquired all desired territories with relative ease, as a result of their size and insignificance to the balance of power on the European continent. It was this confidence that allowed Hitler to pursue his most aggressive foreign policy yet-the demand for the Sudetenland. The Sudetenland was part of Czechoslovakia, which had been created post WWI.Previously German rule, it still contained 3 million German speakers. Hitlers demand was based on the actoring that its German population should be united with the rest of Germany, in spite of Czechoslovakias s all overeignty. In this demand, Hitler demonstrated his willingness to defy the right of independent states in or der to achieve his own ends. President Banes refused not only out of principal, but also because of the regions massive industrial production and abundance of resources. Hitler stood inflexible and threatened that invasion was imminent.British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, in recognition of the situation, flew to meet with Hitler in his Wilhelmshaven residence on September 15, in order to reason with him. Hitler stood firm, justifying his demand by claiming that a Czech-Soviet accordance was a threat to European security. Chamberlain, a conservative politician, believed that Hitler could be appeased, and thus suggested that perhaps Germanys putsch of the Sudetenland could be achieved through non-aggressive means, a suggestion far surpassing his authority. On Sept 26, German, British, French and Italian delegates met in Munich to discuss the details of the takeover.Czech and Soviet delegates were not invited to this meeting, despite their large role in the outcomes. Once the terms had been agreed to, and delegates, particularly Chamberlain, were satisfied, Germany annexed the Sudetenland. Yet again, Hitler had been appeased and had accomplished his expansionary goals, managing to attain another territory prohibited by the Treaty. The movement of Germanys aggressions were those aimed for in Mein Kampf-hence suggesting that ideology had played an integral role in formulating Nazi foreign policy to that success.This liking is further reinforced by the extension of Hitlers grasp on Czechoslovakia, when in 1939 Hitler ordered that the rest of the state be handed over to Germany, which was quickly agreed to. Hitlers accomplishments had all been aimed for in 1924-however, without the non-response of the Allies, and Chamberlains move belief that appeasement would succeed in limiting Hitlers aggressions, Nazi foreign policy would not have been as ambitious, and it is unlikely that aggressions would have succeeded, thus further aggressions, such as with the dem and for the Sudetenland, would have been unlikely.This suggests that although foreign policy was based on ideological principles, its formulation was responsive to the European powers. The responsive nature of Nazi foreign policy is highlighted by the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression treaty of 1939. In Hitlers understanding of race, Slavs were considered racially inferior, and Hitlers own political directly opposed Stalins communism. In fact, Hitlers ultimate intentions in Mein Kampf included obtaining Eastern Europe, by crushing the Slavs.Thus, this non-aggression pact completely contradicted what seemed to be the intention of Nazi foreign policy to 1939, and what Hitler had been adamant about in Mein Kampf. However, the pact was of strategic brilliance for Germany, for several reasons. With serious intentions to invade Poland, Hitler was go about with the possibility of a two-front war from Russia, which he understood would be disqualifying to the Wehrmacht. Further, whilst the Germ an military was capable of fighting Allied resistance, should the Russians have made an alliance with the Allies, the struggle would intensify.Therefore, when German and Russian foreign minister Ribbentropp and Molotov, respectively, subscribe the pact on August 23 1939, it guaranteed temporary security for some(prenominal) powers, and allowed for rapid capture of Poland beginning on September 1 1939. This pact demonstrated Hitlers flexibility in achieving his aims, sacrificing one of his fundamental ideological principles in order to create an effective Nazi foreign policy. In analysing the weightings of ideology and circumstances in the formulation of Nazi foreign policy, at that place exists two main schools of thought intentionalist and structuralist.Intentionalist historians believe that Nazi foreign policy was based entirely on the principles clearly outlined in Mein Kampf, whilst structuralists, such as AJP Taylor, believe Hitlers foreign policy was created by opportunitie s presented to him between 1933-1939, and that documents such as the Hossbach memorandum do not demonstrate clear intentions based on ideological principles but simply aggressive intentions, as per many European powers at the time.In reality, neither arguement encompasses the scope of considerations taken in the formulation of Nazi foreign policy, however to disregard Mein Kampf and the ideological pursuits described in it which Hitlers foreign policies to 1939 directly reflected is unacceptable in understanding the aims of Nazi foreign policy.Therefore it can been seen that whilst the racial and political ideologies of Hitler, as outlined in 1924, played a significant role in Nazi foreign policy to 1939, several other factors, including the response of the Allies to Hitlers aggressions and Germany militarys capacity, greatly affected Nazi foreign policy, and were arctic in both its timing and creation.